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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

PEARL TOPANOTES,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

Case No. 20010127-SC

Priority No. 13

:

REPL Y BRIEF OF CROSS-PETITIONER

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S MISCHARACTERIZATION OF
THE SCOPE OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION
At the outset of the State's reply it is necessary to clarify the parameters of the
inevitable discovery exception because defendant erroneously suggests that, in order to
trigger the exception, "the [SJtate must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the items in issue would have been discovered shortly (inevitably) through lawful means
already under way." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 6 (emphasis added). This is precisely the
erroneously narrow view of the inevitable discovery exception that this Court rejected in
State v. James, 2000 UT 80,fflj15-16,13 P.3d 576.
James was detained in his driveway for D.U.I. James, 2000 UT 80, f 2. The
officer opened the driver's side door of James truck and asked him to step out. James,
2000 UT 80, % 3. Once the door was open, the officer saw an open beer can on the floor
of the cab. Id. When James stepped from his truck the officer observed other indicia of

intoxication. Id. James subsequently failed a standard field sobriety test. James, 2000
UT80,^4.
On appeal from the D.U.I, conviction, the court of appeals held that the officer's
opening of the vehicle door constituted an illegal search. James, 2000 UT 80, <|| 6. The
court of appeals then discussed and rejected the State's argument that the D.U.I. evidence
would have inevitably been discovered. Id. Specifically, the court of appeals held that
the inevitable discovery exception required an "entirely independent, alternate,
intervening, appreciably attenuated investigation aside from the tainted investigation."
State v. James, 1999 UT App 17, ^ 21, 977 P.2d 489.
On certiorari, this Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that the opening of
the driver's door did not amount to an illegal search. James, 2000 UT 80,ffl[9-13. Even
though it was "immaterial" to the resolution of the case, the Court also addressed the
State's concerns that the court of appeals' flawed inevitable discovery analysis "[would]
establish incorrect precedent." Id. at ^| 13. As recognized by the Court,
[t]he inevitable discovery "exception" has been described as an exception to
the exclusionary rule, which dictates that evidence obtained by virtue of
illegal police activity must be suppressed at trial. The exception provides
that evidence that would have been obtained regardless of illegal police
activity will not be suppressed because to do so would violate the
underlying policy of the exclusionary rule—which is to place the police in a
position that is neither better nor worse than it would have been absent the
illegal activity.
James, 2000 UT 80, ^ 14. The Court went on to observe that the criteria set forth by the
court of appeals was "not required by the inevitable discovery exception, but [were]
2

instead merely descriptive of a subcategory of cases falling within the 'independent
source doctrine.'" James, 2000 UT 80, ^ 15. As further recognized by the Court, the
independent source doctrine describes only "one method of satisfying the inevitable
discovery exception which is to demonstrate that the same evidence uncovered by illegal
police activity would have been obtained by an entirely independent, prior investigation."
Id. Therefore, the inevitable discovery exception "does not necessarily include the
elements dictated by the court of appeals," id., or in this case, by defendant. Cond. CrossResp. Br. at 6-7. Put another way, the independent source doctrine is "not coextensive"
with the broader inevitable discovery exception which requires only that the prosecution
"'establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would have
been discovered by lawful means.'" Id. at ^J 16 (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
444 (1984)). Accord State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242 (Ore. 1985) ("Under federal
constitutional analysis, the major requirement of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that
the evidence would have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable
investigatory procedures."), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986); United States v.
Kennedy, 61 F.3d 494, 499 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he inevitable discovery exception to the
exclusionary rule applies when the government can demonstrate either the existence of an
independent, untainted investigation that inevitably would have uncovered the same
evidence or other compelling facts establishing that the disputed evidence inevitably
would have been discovered."), cert, denied, 517 U.S. 119 (1996). See also LaFave,

3

Search and Seizure § 11.4(a), at 249-250 ("Circumstances justifying application of the
"inevitable discovery" rule are most likely to be present if [] investigative procedures
were already in progress prior to the discovery via illegal means, as in Nix[], or where the
circumstances are such that, pursuant to some standardized procedures or established
routine a certain evidence-revealing event would definitely have occurred later.")
(emphasis added).
Defendant cites two Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cases in support of her
erroneously narrow view that "the [S]tate must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the items in issue would have been discovered shortly (inevitably) through
lawful means already under way." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 6-7 (citing, e.g., United
States v. Romero, 692 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1982), and United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d
984, 985 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 1140 (1998)). However, these cases do
not support defendant's proposition. Neither case requires proof of an alternative
investigation underway at the time of the police illegality; in fact, Larsen's holding, the
more recent of the two cases, is completely appositive. 127 F.3d at 986 ("[NJeither the
majority opinion in Nix nor our cases limit the inevitable discovery exception to lines of
investigation that are already underway. They require only that the investigation that
inevitably would have led to the evidence be independent of the constitutional violation.")
(citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443).

4

Rather, Larsen, or the Tenth Circuit, is consistent with the majority of "inevitable
discovery" cases. Unlike "independent source"cases, the issue in determining "inevitable
discovery" is not what did occur in a separate untainted investigation, but what would
occur if the investigation had continued without the illegality. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 &
459; Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987. Indeed, the classic "inevitable discovery" scenario
involves the same officers, or at least officers working together, in a contemporaneous
and continuous investigation. See, e.g., United States v. Haro-Salcedo, 107 F.3d 769,
770 & 113-11A (10th Cir. 1997) (evidence found during illegal search of lawfully detained
vehicle would have been inevitably discovered during subsequent inventory search by
same officers); United States v. Griffin, 48 F.3d 1147, 1148-49 & 1151 (10th Cir.)
(utilizing both "independent source" doctrine and "inevitable discovery" exception in
determining that same officers and agencies would have continued investigation and
discovered involvement of defendant despite prior illegal interrogation of co-defendant),
cert, denied, 515 U.S. 1168 (1995); United States v. Williams, 980 F.Supp. 1225, 122728 & 1231 (D. Utah 1997) (even if officer illegally entered vehicle, discovery of evidence
was inevitable due to ultimate arrest of defendant and impound of vehicle by same
officer), affirmed without published opinion, 183 F.3d 876 (10th Cir. 1999); State v.
Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1990) (court of appeals remands to allow
prosecution to establish if same agency would have inevitably located body of missing
child in dumpster if they had not illegally obtained incriminating statements from
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defendant), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991). See also Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 498-99
(rejecting need for "alternate, independent line of investigation" for inevitable discovery
and concluding that if police had not illegally searched, the airline would have routinely
checked the suspect luggage). Thus, to the extent defendant has correctly characterized
the authorities cited in her brief, see Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 6-7, they do not define the
parameters of the inevitable discovery exception, but rather, represent only a
"subcategory" of cases falling thereunder. James, 2000 UT 80, % 15; Larsen, 127 F3d at
986.
While the Tenth Circuit is not among them, a minority of courts do require proof
that a lawful "inevitable" investigation was "on-going" or "underway" prior to the
illegality. The minority view arose over a disagreement in the federal circuit courts as to
what type ofproof \§ necessary to establish that evidence would have been inevitably
discovered. See Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 498-500 (discussing division among federal
circuits). See also LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.4(a), at 247-48. To minimize
unjustified speculation on what "would" have occurred absent the illegality, some courts,
lead by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, require objective proof that a legal
investigation was in progress prior to the illegality. See, e.g.9 United States v. Hammons,
152 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding a "substantial, alternate" line of investigation
where the officer told defendant that if he did not consent to the search of his vehicle, the
officer would call a drug-detection dog), cert, denied, 119 S.Ct. 1135 (1999).

6

As set out fully in the Brief of Conditional Cross-Petitioner at 16, the majority of
courts follow the Tenth Circuit view which requires no absolute proof, beyond evidence
of predictable police routine, of what would have hypothetically occurred absent the
illegality:
[T]he inevitable discovery exception applies whenever an independent
investigation inevitably would have led to discovery of the evidence,
whether or not the investigation was ongoing at the time of the illegal
police conduct.
Larsen, 127 F.3d at 986 (emphasis added) (even though legal process leading to
discovery of documents did not begin until after the illegal seizure, testimony established
that the legal discovery was inevitable). Thus, Larsen does not establish a new element
for "inevitable discovery" but simply clarifies what Nix already required: the prosecution
must demonstrate historical facts, as opposed to sheer "speculative elements," to support
that hypothetically discovery would have inevitably occurred. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 n.5.
Accord State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916, 923 n.8 (Utah App. 1995) ("inevitable
discovery" requires the "evidence 'would' have been discovered, not simply that it
'could' or 'might' have been discovered") (citation omitted). See also Kennedy, 61 F.3d
at 498-500 (discussing conflicting views of federal circuits and then concluding that
"inevitable discovery" only requires probability based on "compelling" facts that
evidence would have been discovered lawfully).1 See also LaFave, Search and Seizure

1

Kennedy mistakenly lists the Tenth Circuit as a circuit requiring proof of an
actual on-going "independent" investigation, citing United States v. Owen, 782 F.2d 146
7

§ 11.4(a), at 247. As set forth below, application of the clarified inevitable discovery
exception to the record facts here demonstrates that the "routine" warrants check would
have inevitably lead to defendant's arrest on outstanding warrants and the trial court's
ruling should be affirmed on that alternative ground.
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS OVERBROAD
CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE RECORD
Before proceeding to an analysis of the inevitable discovery exception here,
however, it is necessary clarify the record. Specifically, defendant broadly asserts that
police routinely retain identification cards absent reasonable suspicion to run warrants
checks. Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 4-5, 8, 10-11 (citing R88:15-16, 21-22, 28). Defendant
also suggests that she was illegally detained here even before police retained her
identification. Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 5, 8. Defendant's characterizations of the record
are overbroad and belie her claim that the inevitable discovery exception cannot be
successfully applied here. Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 9.
First, defendant repeatedly asserts that "[b]oth officers [] testified that the manner
in which they conducted the warrants check here constituted a "routine" or "common"
practice." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 4-5, 8, 10-11 (citing R88:15-16, 21-22, 28) (emphasis
added). Based on this self-serving characterization of the record defendant concludes
that, "[b]y their own admissions, these officers routinely violated the law to conduct a

(10th Cir. 1986). However, Larsen, a later Tenth Circuit case, clarifies that Owens
imposes no such requirement. Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987.
8

warrants check." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 4. A careful reading of the record, however,
illustrates that defendant's characterization is misleading. Neither officer testified that
they routinely acted illegally, i.e., detained individuals without reasonable suspicion.
Rather, the officers testified that running a warrants check on individuals they encounter
is routine. For example, Sergeant Hansen responded affirmatively to defense counsel's
question: "You called in for the warrants check as a matter of routine procedure?"
(R88:16). Further, Officer Mitchell responded as follows to the prosecutor's query
whether Sergeant Hansen uassign[ed him] any duties" with regard to their investigation of
defendant: "As I walked up, he handed me her identification and I don't recall if he
asked me to run her for warrants or if I just ran her for warrants. It's a common practice"
(R88:21-22). Thus, while Sergeant Hansen agreed with defense counsel's
characterization of the warrants check as "routine procedure," and Officer Mitchell
similarly recognized that a warrants check is "common practice," neither officer testified
that the "manner" in which the warrants check was conducted here, i.e., by retaining
defendant's identification absent reasonable suspicion, was either routine or common
(R88:16, 21-22, 27). Rather, it was the warrants check itself which was routine or
common procedure (id.). Defendant's characterization of the record is therefore
misleading.
Second, defendant repeatedly states that police "violated [her] Fourth Amendment
rights when they unlawfully detained her and retained possession of her identification to
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run a warrants check." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 5, 8 (emphasis added). To the extent
defendant is suggesting there are other indicia of illegal detention in this case, her
assertion is unsupportable. The court of appeals correctly recognized that the only
mistake police made here was in retaining defendant's identification for the duration of
the warrants check. See State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT App 311 at % 8 n.3, 14 P.3d 695,
cert, granted, 29 P3d 1 (Utah 2001) (a copy of the court of appeals decision is contained
in add. A, Cond. Cross Pet. Br.). There is no dispute that police could lawfully request
defendant's name or identification pursuant to their investigation of the recently arrested
prostitute. See Cond. Cross Pet. Br. at 17. Therefore, if police had merely viewed the
identification, obtained defendant's name therefrom, and promptly returned it, the
subsequent warrants check would not have "per se" escalate[d] the encounter into a level
two stop." Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, % 13 n.2, 998 P.2d 274 (citations
omitted). Thus defendant's voluntary encounter with police only rose to an illegal
detention when, absent reasonable suspicion, police did not immediately return her
identification. Id. (clarifying that retention of a suspect's identification must be supported
by reasonable suspicion). To the extent defendant suggests otherwise, the suggestion is
unsupportable and should be rejected on that ground.
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RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE
STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY THEORY: THE WARRANTS
CHECK WAS AN ESTABLISHED ROUTINE THAT WAS GOING
TO BE PERFORMED WHETHER DEFENDANT IDENTIFIED
HERSELF VERBALLY OR VIA IDENTIFICATION
The above record clarifications are important because defendant's overbroad
characterizations erroneously suggest that police retention of her identification was
necessary to the warrants check leading to her arrest on outstanding warrants. See Cond.
Cross-Pet. Br. at 20 (citing authorities). Defendant's suggestion is mistaken. As fully set
forth in the Brief of Conditional Cross-Petitioner at 18, a warrants check can be
performed based solely on a suspect's name. Thus, police retention of defendant's
identification was not necessary to the success of the instant warrants check which would
have been performed even if defendant had had no identification on her person. Id.
Defendant disputes that the warrants check would have been performed even
without her identification and characterizes the State's inevitable discovery exception
theory as "speculative"and "revisionist history." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 8-10, 12.
Specifically, defendant asserts that if police had "promptly return[ed her identification,
she] was free to go"; therefore, defendant suggests police would not have had the
information needed to run the warrants check. Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 8-10, 12.
Defendant broadly concludes that "the record in this case could never support that the
officers 'would' have run a warrants check through lawful means, once they already
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conducted the check through unlawful means." Cond. Cross-Resp. Br. at 9. It is
defendant's claims, however, that are speculative and unsupported.
As set out previously, the issue in determining "inevitable discovery" is not what
did occur in a separate untainted investigation, but what would occur if the investigation
had continued without the illegality. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 & 459; Larsen, 127 F.3d at
987. In other words, "viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful
[seizure]," the Court must determine "what would have happened had the unlawful
[seizure] never occurred." Kennedy, 61 F.3d at 497. There is no dispute that police
lawfully inquired as to defendant's identity; therefore, the circumstances must be viewed
as they existed at the instant before the only illegal action here—police retention of
defendant's identification for the duration of the warrants check. Topanotes, 2000 UT
App 311 at TJ 8 n.3. At that instant, defendant had already willingly identified herself to
police and a routine warrants check was about to be performed (R88:10-14, 16, 22, 27).
Precisely because defendant willingly turned over her identification and was cooperating
with police, it is reasonable to assume that if she had had no identification, or if police
had asked for her name instead of for her identification, defendant would have just as
willingly verbally identified herself (id.). Accordingly, it is a reasonable inference from
these facts that the remainder of the encounter would have proceeded unchanged:
Defendant would have agreed—as she did here—to cooperate with police attempting to
confirm her roommates' identity and residence, during which time police would have
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completed the five minute warrants check (R88:11, 22). Thus, based on the record facts
and reasonable inferences therefrom, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that
defendant would have been willingly conversing with police—as she was here—when the
outstanding warrants leading to her immediate arrest were discovered (id.).
CONCLUSION
The court of appeals' remand is superfluous on these facts. The outstanding
warrants leading to defendant's arrest would have legally and inevitably been discovered
as the result of a routine warrants check, even if defendant had had no identification on
her person. Because defendant was cooperating in the police investigation of her
roommate, she would have continued to be present at the scene when the warrants check
revealed outstanding warrants for her arrest five minutes later. This Court should
therefore affirm the denial of the motion to suppress on the alternative ground of
inevitable discovery.
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